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CITATIONS TO THE RECOld
Citations to the Record will be abbreviated as follows:
Record on Appeal

"R. "

Trial Transcript

"Tr."

Exhibit

"Ex."

Findings of Fact

"F."

Conclusions of Law

"C."

Judgment

"J."

The Addendum includes the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and the Judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court
of Appeals and shall be cited to as "Add." with the page number
following the Record or Exhibit citation.
CONTROLLING LAW
The considerations governing the grant of review of certiorari
are set forth in Rule 46, Utah R. A P P . P.:
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter
of right, but of judicial discretion, and will
be granted only for special and important
reasons.
The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme
Court f s discretion, indicate the character of
reasons that will be considered:
(a)

When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a
decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law;

(b)

When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question in state or federal
law in a way that is in conflict with a
decision of the Supreme Court;

-v-

(c)

When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court as to call for an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power of supervision; or

(d)

When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state,
or federal law which has not been, but
should be, settled by the Supreme Court.

(Emphasis added).
REPORT OF DECISION
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported in Sciunders v.
Sharp. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Ct. App. June 5, 1990) (Add. 48-52).
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Although plaintiffs/petitioners (sometimes collectively "White
Pine") list three questions as being presented for review, those
issues can be synthesized into one central issue: Did the Court of
Appeals correctly hold that White Pine's appeal was simply an
attempt to relitigate the factual issues determined by the trial
court in the Sharps1 favor?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Although White Pine asserts a plethora of alleged errors
committed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in its review
of that decision, once its motivation in filing a complaint is
revealed,

this case becomes very simple.

White

Pine was a

partnership of desperate men who ran out of the dollars needed to
honor their obligations.1 After years of paying under the parties1
Contract without complaint, White Pine was forced to invent excuses
for their non-performance and finally took the startling and
aggressive posture of filing a Complaint against the Sharps, even
though it admittedly had failed to pay property taxes, installment
payments and to provide to the Sharps certain utility connections.
As the trial court found, these excuses were never mentioned to the
Sharps until immediately prior to the filing of their Complaint in
September of 1986:
1

Felton testified "we have this construction loan that's in
default and we're desperate at this point. Make no mistake about
it. Everybody's going bankrupt at this point."
(Tr. 309, R.
1643) .
1

Significantly, as bearing upon the credibility
of plaintiffs1 [White Pine's] arguments is the
fact unrebutted that plaintiffs made no claims
whatsoever of breach by the Sharps until after
their own admitted breaches of the Closing
Documents.
(F. 53, R. 1342, Add. 17).
This action arose when White Pine filed a Complaint the day
before a scheduled Trustee's Sale of certain property located in
White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Utah (the "Property").
F. 95; R. 1352, Add. 27).

(R. 2-89,

The Complaint sought to enjoin the

scheduled Trustee's Sale, alleging inter alia, that the Sharps had
breached the Contract between the parties2 by failing to release
Lot 6 and the roadway and 7.35 acres of the unplatted portion of
the Property.

(R. 2-89).

2

The Contract between the parties includes a Memorandum of
Closing Terms (hereinafter the "Memo") (Ex. 156), a Special
Warranty Deed (Ex. 17) , a Trust Deed Note together with an Addendum
to the Trust Deed Note (Ex. 3) and a Trust Deed (Ex. 2) (collectively referred to as "the Contract"). (F. 10, R. 1330, Add. 5).
The initial draft of a purchase agreement was prepared by counterclaim defendant, Paul H. Landes, a signatory to the final documents
composing the parties' Contract.
(Ex. 13, Tr. 728, R. 1645).
Although White Pine claims, on page 3 of its Petition that the
Contract was prepared by the Sharps' attorney, Jon C. Heaton, in
fact, the parties extensively negotiated the terms of the contract.
(Tr. 556, R. 1644). For instance, four drafts of the Earnest Money
were discussed. (Tr. 729-730, R. 1645) . The rule of construction
that ambiguity in a contract is construed against its drafter is
inapplicable where such contract is the result of extensive
negotiations between the parties. Centennial Enter, v. Mansfield
Dev. Co.. 568 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1977). Additionally, the rule only
functions after the court has considered all pertinent extrinsic
evidence and is still uncertain as to the contract's interpretation. Wilburn v .Interstate Elec. , 748 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) .
2

The case arose against the following background. The Property
was purchased with a down payment at closing and a promise to make
five annual installments payable on June 30 of each subsequent year
in the amount of $192,611.06 principal, together with accrued
interest.

(Ex. 3).

The Property was intended to be promptly

developed as a Planned Unit Development ("PUD") into twelve 4 or 5
acre lots, with an internal roadway dedicated to public use.
5, R. 1329, Add. 4, Ex. 14 and 39).

(F.

The dedication of the roadway

was of such vital importance to the parties that an initial plat
was attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo.

(F. 14 and 19, R. 1331,

1333, Add. 6, 8, Ex. 15). Paragraph 5 of the Memo further provides
that "changes in the proposed plat and the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions when prepared shall be subject
to the reasonable approval of the Seller [the Sharps]."

(F. 18, R.

1332-33, Add. 7-8, Ex. 15). The Sharps were concerned that, in the
event of default, they possessed access to the Property (Tr. 749750, R. 1645) and Robert Felton ("Felton") , one of the general
partners of White Pine, knew the Sharps "wanted the right to
approve them [any changes] reasonably."

(Tr. 138, R. 1642).

The Memo also provided after "the recordation of a PUD Plat
and Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions" ("CCRs")
that White Pine would be entitled to the release of three PUD lots
of its "choice together with said roadway" described
proposed plat attached as Exhibit
Ex. 15)(emphasis added).

f

A. •

in the

(F. 17, R. 1332, Add. 7,

For each $140,000.00 in principal paid
3

thereafter and after recordation of the PUD, White Pine "shall be
entitled to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice,."
and 16, R. 1331-32, Add. 6-7, Ex. 15)(emphasis added).

(F. 15

The Memo

further provided the Sharps were entitled to one sewer connection
and

one culinary water connection

in the PUD system

for "a

connection fee and service fee equal to the pro rata cost to the
purchaser of a lot."

(F. 22, R. 1334, Add. 9, Ex. 15). 3

White Pine first defaulted on its June 30, 1983 payment, which
default was subsequently cured in November of 1983.

(F. 27, R.

1336, Add. 11, Ex. 22; F. 31, R. 1337, Add. 12, Ex. 4 and 44).

In

December of 1983, White Pine, with the written consent of the
Sharps, recorded a plat, which platted only a portion of the
Property, instead of the entire Property as originally intended.
(F. 39-40, R. 1339, Add. 14, Ex. 51). The plat also differed from
White Pine's original intent by including an Owner's Dedication for
a private roadway in the PUD.

(F. 19, R. 1333, Add. 8, Ex. 39; F.

34, R. 1337, Add. 12, Ex. 1).

The Sharps were concerned about

access to the Property in the event they were required to take it

3

In both their Brief filed with the Court of Appeals and their
Petition, White Pine failed to address the trial court's finding
that they also breached the Contract "by failing to make available
[to the Sharps who still owned adjoining lands] sewer and water
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot." (F.
100, R. 1354, Add. 29). Although construction primarily commenced
in 1983 for the sewer and water systems, neither was completed or
operational at the time of trial, nor had the sewer construction
been approved by the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District
("SBSID"). (F. 82, R. 1349-50, Add. 24-25, Ex. 83, 83(a), 99-108).
4

back in a foreclosure.

(Tr. 748-750, R. 1645).

Had the entire

Property been platted as originally contemplated, access would not
have been an issue since if the Sharps took it back in a foreclosure sale, they would be owners and purchasers
entitling them to access under the CCRs recorded.
1645).

of PUD lots

(Tr. 757-759, R.

Had the roadway remained public, their access also would

have been assured. Accordingly, at the time the Sharps were asked
to approve the plat and the CCRs, their continued right of access
was confirmed with White Pine both orally and in writing (F. 35-39,
R. 1338-39, Add. 13-14, Ex. 25, 25(a), 26, 26(a)).
White Pine again defaulted under the terms of the Contract in
November of 1984 by failing to pay all of the property taxes due.
The 1984 taxes and all subsequent property taxes remained unpaid
($20,368.62) through the time of trial.
16).

(F. 48-49, R. 1341, Add.

The taxes were only paid on January 13, 1989 when the trial

court, as a condition of approving the plaintiffs1 supersedeas
bond, ordered the plaintiffs to pay them.

(R. 1687-1691).

White

Pine further defaulted under the terms of the Contract by failing
to make

all

of the June 30, 1985

installment

payment

(only

$59,709.47 was paid) and the remaining installment payment due
under the Contract in 1986.

(F. 50, R. 1342, Add. 17, Ex. 44).

The Sharps recorded a Notice of Default on September 16, 1985.
(F. 51, R. 1342, Add. 17, Ex. 55). After White Pine received the
Notice of Default, Felton assured the Sharps "every attempt is
being made to resolve the problem [of our non-payment]."
5

(F. 52,

R. 1342, Add. 17, Ex. 31). As the trial court found:

"No written

or oral claim of default on the part of the Sharps under the
Closing Documents was made by the plaintiffs until February 27,
1986, subsequent to plaintiffs' own defaults."

(F. 71, R. 1347,

Add. 22, Ex. 35; Tr. 200-201, R. 1643). Nor did White Pine request
the release of Lot 6 and the roadway until long after their own
defaults under the Contract.4
Judge Frederick held White Pine had materially breached the
Contract and the Sharps had substantially complied with its terms.
(F. 48, 50, 53, 57, 100, R. 1341-43, 1354, Add. 16-18, 29).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed the issues presented
by plaintiffs, concluding that "Buyers are essentially challenging
the trial court's findings of fact" and the legal issues raised by
the appellants

"strike at the trial court's determination of

whether there was a material breach of contract and if so, when,
and by whom."

Saunders v. Sharp. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 69-70

(Utah Ct. App. May 25, 1990, Add. 48-52).

White Pine's Petition

for Rehearing was denied June 26, 1990.

4

The district court found that "Plaintiffs' first requests"
for release of Lot 6 and the roadway were "February 27, 1986 and
May 7, 1986, respectively."
(F. 59, R. 1343-1344, Add. 18-19).
Also, White Pine did not request the release of 7.35 acres of the
unplatted property until February 27, 1986. Id. The Contract,
however, specifically provides that only "PUD lots" are to be
released. Id. As the district court found, "[a]s of these dates,
plaintiffs [White Pine] were still and are in of [sic] default."
Id.
6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Most of the omissions and misstatements of fact in plaintiffs'
Petition for Writ of Certiorari ("Petition") relate entirely to
their

claim

the Court

of Appeals

failed

to address

allegedly pure issues of law which they had raised.

certain

Plaintiffs

claim they are arguing only matters of law, citing to various
"undisputed" facts which form the foundation to their arguments.
These facts, however, instead of being "undisputed," were actually
resolved against them by the District Court. The Court of Appeals
clearly saw through plaintiffs' veil, holding that "we are [not]
thus obliged to consider the . . . evidence . . . from 'appellants'
view of the way he or she believes the facts should have been
found.'"5

Saunders at 70.

White Pine's attack upon the District Court's legal conclusions must fail when contrasted with the factual issues which were
resolved against them at trial.

Due to space limitations and to

avoid redundancy, those facts pertaining to White Pine's claimed

5

Further evidence of White Pine's efforts to relitigate the
factual findings of the trial court can be found in their citations
to the Record. The vast majority of their citations are solely to
the testimony of the plaintiffs. The only Findings of Fact of the
trial court cited by plaintiffs are in those instances concerning
the background of the case about which there never has been any
dispute, such as quotations of the language from the Contract, the
fact that the Property was conveyed by the Sharps, and the fact
that the deeds and the plat were recorded with the Summit County
Recorder. All of the trial court's Findings of Fact relating to
the issues of who breached and when the breach occurred are totally
disregarded by the plaintiffs.
7

legal issues will be correctly set forth herein under Point I of
the Sharps1 Argument.
ARGUMENT
I
PLAINTIFFS1 "LEGAL ISSUES" ARE SIMPLY
ATTEMPTS TO RELITIGATE THE FACTS
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AGAINST THEM.
White Pine sets forth seven alleged "legal issues" on page 9
of its Petition which, it contends, the Court of Appeals failed to
address. In the first alleged "legal issue," White Pine claims the
Court

of Appeals

failed

to address

the

argument

the

Sharps

"breached the parties1 Contract by failing to reconvey property
under the Trust deed (sic) . . . [for which they] had [been] paid
. ..."
must

This argument, as well as all the remaining arguments,

fail when an examination

is made of the trial

court's

findings.
White Pine claims it satisfied all conditions to a release of
7.35 acres of the unplatted Property.

Plaintiffs' Petition, p. 5.

However, the parties' Contract specifically provides only for the
release of platted PUD lots.

The Memo provided:

Upon the recordation of the PUD plat and
Declaration of Covenants. Conditions and
Restrictions with the Summit County Recorder.
Buyer shall be entitled to the release from
the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD lots of
Buyer's choice together with the said roadway
. . . .

(Emphasis added.)

(F. 17, R. 1332, Add. 7, Ex. D15).

White Pine also asserts, on page 5 of its Petition, that it
8

satisfied all conditions on December 23, 1983 to the release of
five lots and the roadway.

Lots 1-5, however, were reconveyed.6

Plaintiffs1 argument regarding the roadway, which is also the
subject of their second and seventh "legal issues," also must fail
since it ignores the trial court's finding that execution by the
Sharps of the Consent to Record constituted a release of the
roadway pursuant to the language of the plat and CCRs which
"reserved a non-exclusive easement for utilities and vehicular and
pedestrian access over the private roadway . . . •"7

(F. 39, R.

1339, Add. 14). Felton himself acknowledged in a letter to Heaton
that "the deeds for the roads [sic] may be difficult to do."
44, R. 1340, Add. 15, Ex. 30).

(F.

The Sharps were never presented

with a document in recordable form releasing the roadway from the
Trust Deed.
would

be the

Felton testified that "Associated Title probably"
one to prepare

the reconveyance.

(Tr. 178) .

^hite Pine, on page 6 of its Petition, implies that because
a partial reconveyance covering Lots 1-5 was not recorded until
nearly two years later, the Sharps are, somehow, responsible. The
Sharps, however, directed the Trustee, Associated Title to reconvey
the lots on January 18, 1984, shortly after plaintiffs requested
the release.
(F. 42, R. 1340, Add. 15, Ex. 28). The Partial
Reconveyance was not prepared by Associated Title until January 7,
1986, or recorded until March 26, 1986. (F. 43, R. 1340, Add. 15,
Ex. 45). No explanation of the delay was provided at trial.
Associated Title, named by the plaintiffs as a defendant in the
action, was never served by plaintiffs and did not appear at trial.
(F. 43, R. 1430, Add. 15).
7

After recordation of the plat, the CCRs and the Consent to
Record, plaintiffs proceeded without hesitation to construct the
roadway and other improvements on the Property (F. 41, R. 1340,
Add. 15).
9

Additionally, it ignores the finding that the parties subsequently
modified their Contract to allow the Sharps access across the
internal roadway in consideration of the Sharps1 consenting to the
recordation of a plat platting only one-half of the Property.8

(F.

39, R. 1338, Add. 14). Further, plaintiffs1 contention, on page 6
of their Petition, that the Sharps never released the roadway is
directly contrary to the trial court's finding that the Sharps gave
repeated assurances, before and after trial, to White Pine they did
not intend to interfere through their foreclosure with White Pine's

8

White Pine in footnote 3 on page 14 of its Petition cites to
its Court of Appeals Reply Brief in which it claimed there is no
evidence White Pine agreed to an easement before the Sharps
executed the Consent to Record.
This assertion ignores the
testimony of attorney Jon Heaton, accepted by the trial court. On
November 18, 1983, Mr. Heaton prepared a letter to the Sharps as an
embodiment of the representations White Pine was making or willing
to make to the Sharps to secure their consent to the final plat.
(Tr., 751, R. 1645). The letter indicated:
At a later time in the near future Hy [Saunders] has
indicated he will seek release of Lots 1 through 5 of the
platted subdivision along with his road (White Pine
L a n e ) . . . . When those releases are made pursuant to
your [the Sharps'] instruction we will ensure that rights
are reserved in White Pine Lane for access for the
southern portions of the property purchased from you
until your Deed of Trust is fully paid.
(F. 35, R. 1338, Add. 13, Ex. 25 and 25(a)). On November 21, 1983,
Felton wrote Heaton a reply in which he stated "[i]t is perfectly
acceptable to us [White Pine] that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an
easement over Whit Pine Lane to the southern part of his property
as well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road up to the western
boundary of Lot 6."
(F. 36, r. 1338, Add. 13, Ex. 26). Heaton
noted in the margin of a copy of the letter that Felton agreed
"access over road [White Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops
undeveloped property Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch." (F. 37, R. 1338,
Add. 13, Ex. 26(a)).
10

access and utility easements9

(F. 88, R. 1351, Add. 26; see, also,

Ex. 33, Tr. 22-25, 27-28, 43, R. 164).
White Pine finally asserts, on page 5 of its Petition, that it
satisfied all conditions by June 30, 1984, to the release of Lot 6.
This claimed fact is also the fourth "legal issue" relating to
their failure to request a reconveyance. Such an argument ignores
the specific language of the Contract requiring a "choice" by the
Buyer (F. 16, 17, 61, R. 1332, 1344, Add. 7, 19) and the trial
court's finding that the parties1 course of conduct established the
practice of requesting a reconveyance.10

(F. 47, R. 1341, Add.

9

A1though White Pine claims, on page 7 of its Petition, that
the Sharps sought to foreclose the roadway, all notices of default
and notices of trustee's sale subsequently recorded against the
subject Property specifically provided that the notices were
SUBJECT TO easements, encroachments, restrictions, rights
of way and matters of record enforceable in law [sic]
equity.
(F. 56, R. 1343, Add. 18, Ex. 5, 36, 55, 56 and 58).
10

White Pine asserts, at page 12 of its Petition, that the
Contract is unambiguous and its interpretation is therefore a
question of law. However,if a trial court finds facts respecting
the intentions of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, review
is strictly limited. Kimball v. Campbell (cited by plaintiffs),
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). This Court has consistently held
that the meaning and intent of an agreement can be determined from
the course of conduct and the action and performance of the parties
to the agreement. Zeese v. Estate of Siecrel. 534 P.2d 85 (Utah
1975); Bullfrog Marina. Int. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972).
Additionally, the issue of whether a contract has been modified is
a question of fact.
Coonrod & Walz Const. Co. Inc. v. Motel
Enterprises. Inc. . 217 Kan. 63, 535 P.2d 971 (1975); Resource Enq.
Inc. v. Siler. 94 Idaho 935, 500 P.2d 836 (1972). Finally, where
several documents are executed simultaneously and are clearly
interrelated, they must be construed together and harmonized if
possible. Atlas Corp. v. Cloves Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah
11

16) .
White Pine's assertion, on page 7, that only one platted lot,
Lot 6, remained to be released, therefore, requiring no choice
ignores the evidence on which the trial court based its Findings.
White Pine was "land banking."

That is, White Pine delayed

recording a final plat because "[a]s soon as we file the plat, real
estate taxes are going to go up significantly, which we would like
to avoid until we have an actual buyer for one of the lots."

(F.

28, R. 1336, Add. 11, Ex. 23). White Pine wanted to keep open its
options as to the unplatted acreage, later requesting by letter the
approval by the Sharps of a "multi-family development."

(F. 45, R.

1340-41, Add. 15-16, Ex. 29). Accordingly, White Pine "may have
chosen to prepare a plat of the then unplatted acreage and seek a
release of a portion of it instead of Lot 6."

(F. 61, R. 1344,

Add. 19).11
White Pine's third "legal issue" that the district court
concluded "[t]he Sharps breach of contract was legally excused by
their reliance on advice of counsel" is simply a misstatement of
the ruling of the trial court. The trial court found only that the
Sharps' reliance on the advice of counsel was in good fciith and a
defense to the statutory cause of action for failure to reconvey
1987).
11

As Felton testified: "Wait a minute, wait a minute. * * *
I do believe the contract says lots of the buyer's choice and that
would require a choice."
(F. 61, R. 1344, Add. 19; Tr. 34, R.
1643) .
12

asserted by plaintiffs under Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-33.

(F.

91, R. 1351, Add. 26; C. 23-24, R. 60, Add. 35). The Sharps never
urged this defense except in reference to that statute.12
"Legal issue" number five wherein White Pine alleges the trial
court erred by concluding it was not entitled to the legal remedy
of specific performance relates back to the factual underpinnings
of the first "legal issue," that is, issues of breach. A party to
a contract, however, is not entitled to specific performance if he
is, himself, in breach.

Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah

1974); LHIW Inc. v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961 (Utah 1988).

It was the

specific finding of the trial court that it was the plaintiffs who
were in breach of the Contract.

(F. 53, R. 1342, Add. 17).

White Pine argues as its sixth "legal issue" that the trial
court erred in determining White Pine breached the Contract by
failing to pay approximately $3,200.00 in property taxes even
though it had paid $1,500,000.00 to the Sharps.

This argument

ignores the fact that the Trust Deed requires the trustor (plaintiffs) to "pay at least ten days before delinquency all taxes and
assessments affecting said property" (F. 48, R. 1341, Add. 16, Ex.
2) and the failure to pay real estate taxes is a material default
precluding a release of property from a mortgage.

City Bank

Farmers Trust Co. v. Hickman. 164 Misc. 234, 297 N.Y.S. 592, 595

1z

Judge Frederick also found that the Sharps did request a
reconveyance of Lots 1-5 from the trustee (F. 42, R. 1340, Add. 15,
Ex. 30) .
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(Sup. Ct. 1937); Clason's Point Land Co. v. Swartz. 237 A.D. 741,
262 N.Y.S. 756, 760

(App. Div. 1933); Markovitz v. Republic

National Bank, 651 F.2d 825, 827 (2nd Cir. 1981).
White Pine seems to imply on page 6 of its Petition that
because there was no assertion of default regarding the failure of
plaintiffs to pay the property taxes, somehow, their obligation to
pay those taxes disappeared. A breach is a breach, however, at the
time it occurs, regardless of whether the non-breaching party seeks
to enforce the agreement.

Biork v. April Indus., 547 P.2d 219

(Utah 1976), appeal after remand, 560 P.2d 315, cert, den. 97 S.Ct.
2634, 431 U.S. 930, 50 L.Ed.2d 2456 (Damages began to accrue once
defendant breached agreement.

Plaintiffs not required to take

steps to enforce agreement); see Ouin Blair Enter, v. Julien Const.
Co.. 597 P.2d 945 (Wyo. 1979)(Parties free to ignore provisions of
contract but must understand that they bear the consequences of
such disregard when breach becomes fact of life).
Further, White Pine failed to pay any subsequent assessments
of yearly property taxes
trial).

(totaling $20,368.62 at the time of

(F. 48-49, R. 1341-42, Add. 16-17).

It also failed to pay

the total amount due on the 1985 installment payment and failed to
pay any portion of the 1986 installment payment.

(F. 50, R. 1342,

Add. 17) . Although White Pine attempts to exploit the amounts paid
under the Addendum to the Promissory Note, it omits to disclose the
fact that Judgment was rendered against

it in the amount of

$726,784.67 as of September 26, 1988 and interest has been accruing
14

since then on the principal alone in the per diem amount of
$183.32.

(J. p. 3, Add. 42).

White Pine further neglects to

address the trial court's finding that plaintiffs also breached the
parties1 Contract by failing to make available sewer and water
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot.

(F.

100, R. 1354, Add. 29) .13
As demonstrated above, plaintiffs have sought to conjure up
purported "legal issues" when, in fact, they have ignored or
misstated the factual findings of the trial court. The special and
important reasons for which a petition for a writ of certiorari
should be granted ought not include a petitioner's attempted
relitigation of the facts.
II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION
OF WHETHER THERE WAS A MATERIAL BREACH
OF CONTRACT CONSTITUTES AN ISSUE OF
FACT FOR THE FACT FINDER.
Petitioners argue that the decision of the Court of Appeals is

13

Plaintiffs make the claim, at page 5 of its Petition, that
it constructed improvements at a cost of $1,063,348.10 "benefiting
all of the Property . . . ." The water and sewer systems, however,
were not completed or operational at the time of trial nor had the
sewer system been improved for use. (F. 82, R. 1349-50, Add. 2425) . Further, plaintiffs previously sued Summit County, the SBSID
and various officials thereof because "the imposition of the
requirement that plaintiffs construct an off-site sewer approximately one mile in length" means "the costs of developing the
entire project became prohibitive." (F. 67, R. 1346, Add. 21, Ex.
116) . In the SBSID litigation, plaintiffs blamed these defendants
for the threatened foreclosure (F. 69, R. 1346-47, Add. 21-22) and
claimed most of the "same damages they sought to recover from the
Sharps in the present case." (F. 70, R. 1347, Add. 22).
15

contrary to the proposition set forth in Avaikos v. Lowry. 54 Utah
217, 179 P 988 (919), where this Court held:

"Twlhere the facts

are undisputed, the question of whether or not they constitute a
performance or breach of the contract is one of law for the Court."
Id. at 990 (quoting 13 C.J. 790, paragraph 1011).
added.)

(Emphasis

The converse proposition, however, has also been recog-

nized in Schick v. Ashton, 7 Utah 2d 152, 320 P.2d 664, where this
Court held "whether a promisor has made and kept his promise is a
jury question where the evidence is in conflict."
added.)

(Emphasis

Id. at 665. See also Commercial Security Bank v. Hodson,

18 Utah 2d 388, 393 P.2d 482 (1964) (Issue of whether bank entered
into contract and whether it breached such contract are questions
for the jury).
In the instant case, the facts are not only disputed, but have
been hotly contested from the outset through the briefing on
appeal.

The trial court entered 104 extensive Findings of Fact

after White Pine submitted and argued 132 pages of objections. (R.
926-1028) . Since the facts are clearly disputed, Avaikos. the case
cited by the petitioners as the only controlling Utah authority, is
inapposite to this case and the standards set forth in the Schick
and Commercial Security Bank cases should control.
The questions of who breached and when that breach occurred
are to be determined by the fact finder.
made the

factual

determination

Here, Judge Frederick

that White

Pine breached

the

Contract and the Sharps did not, a finding that may not be set
16

aside unless clearly erroneous.

Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786

P.2d 760 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 52(a).
The following language in Schick v. Ashton is apt in the
context of White Pine's Petition:
Plaintiffs urge that defendants violated their
contract as a matter of law.
Apparently
plaintiffs base such contention on facts
related in their brief which are most favorable to their own position. But such contention does not square with the familiar and
oft-repeated principal that on review the
evidence will be canvassed in a light most
favorable to the approval of the jury's verdict.
Schick v. Ashton. 320 P.2d at 665.
Ill
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED
THE MARSHALLING DOCTRINE.
In Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), a
case relied on heavily by plaintiffs, this Court set forth the
former standard to be applied in reviewing the findings of fact
made by a trial court, taking as a
starting point the trial courtfs findings and
not Erickson's [appellant's] recitations of
the facts. To mount a successful attack on
the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshall all the evidence in support
of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding. (Citations omitted).
(Emphasis added.)

Id. at 1070.

The standard of review has been amended subsequent to the
17

Scharf decision and now sets forth a new, stronger standard of
review.
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
(Emphasis added.)

Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P.

Here, as noted by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners
"failed to demonstrate that the findings are against the clear
weight of the evidence."

Saunders, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 70.

(Add. 50). The Court then concluded, correctly under the marshalling doctrine, that the findings of fact as determined by the trial
court must be accepted as valid.
Appellants argue the Court of Appeals failed to examine White
Pine's "legal arguments" irrespective of White Pine's failure to
marshall,

a

duty

"implicit

in

Plaintiffs' Petition at page 15.

all

the

marshalling

cases."

Plaintiffs' argument, however,

disregards the language of the Court of Appeals implicitly stating
that those issues of law had been examined and rejected.

In

beginning its analysis of the breach of contract issues raised on
appeal, the Court of Appeals took note of the appellants' claim
their issues on appeal were questions of law and concluded "after
scrutinizing those issues, that buyers are essentially challenging
the trial court's findings of fact."
at 69.

(Add. 49).

(Emphasis added.)

Saunders

Additionally, courts are not obligated to

examine every issue raised by an appellant but will affirm the
18

decision of the trial court whenever it can do so on a proper
ground even if it was not the ground on which the trial court
relied,u

Bill Nav & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const, Co. . 677

P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984).
Further, plaintiffs1

Petition is nearly identical to the

Petition for Rehearing filed by plaintiffs in the Court of Appeals,
in which plaintiffs advanced the same claim that their "legal
The denial of plaintiffs1

arguments" had not been analyzed.

Petition for Rehearing is a further indication by the Court of
Appeals that White Pine's claimed

"legal arguments" had been

examined and found to be without merit.

See. In Re; Shirk's

Estate. 194 Kan. 671# 401 P.2d 297 (1965) (Motion for rehearing
denied where motion presents "no issue not fully considered and
determined in original opinion" (Emphasis added.))
CONCLUSION
The questions of breach of contract and substantial performance are questions of fact where the evidence is in dispute. The
Court of Appeals examined the claimed "legal issues" raised by the
appellants and concluded, after scrutiny, that they were factually
based and without merit.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was

in accord with case law as established by decisions of the Court of

14

If, as White Pine argues, appellate courts have a duty to
examine every single issue raisedf the appellate process would be
reduced to an issue raising contest which rewards appellants, like
the instant ones, who presented more than two dozen argument
headings in their Brief in the Court of Appeals.
19

Appeals and this Court and is not such a departure from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require
this Court to exercise its power of supervision.

A writ of

certiorari is to be granted only for special and important reasons,
not for the redetermination of factual issues.

For the reasons

stated above, White Pine's Petition should be denied.

20

DATED this

day of August, 1990.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

BY J}cnriaAS)Q\*

UJ^riJiy\

Ddn£ld J. Winded
^
Attorneys for Appellees Sharp

Kathy A./-T. Da\
Attorneys for Appellees Sharp

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the & o

day of August, 1990, I

caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to be
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Glen D. Watkins, Esq.
Robert M. Anderson, Esq.
Bruce Wycoff, Esq.
ANDERSON & WATKINS
Valley Tower, Seventh Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1018
John B. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East 100 South
Post Office Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
David L. Gladwell
Chapter 7 Trustee
Post Office Box 12069
Ogden, Utah 84412
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I further certify that, on the date listed above, I caused ten true
and correct copies of the same to be mailed, first class, postage
prepaid, to:
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT FELTON;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORP.,
a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE
RANCHES, a Utah general
partnership; WHITE PINE
ENTERPRISES, a Utah general
partnership; and KENNETH R.
NORTON, dba Interstate Rentals,
Inc., a Nevada corporation,
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
Petition No. 900360
-vJOHN C, SHARP and GERALDINE Y.
SHARP,
Defendants and Respondents.
ADDENDUM
Robert M. Anderson
Glen D. Watkins
Bruce Wycoff
ANDERSON & WATKINS
Valley Tower, Seventh Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1018
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Petitioners Leon
H. Saunders; Robert Felton;
Saunders Land Investment;
White Pine Ranches and
White Pine Enterprises
John B, Anderson
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East 100 South
Post Office Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 363-9345
Attorneys for Petitioner Kenneth R.
Norton dba Interstate Rentals, Inc.

Donald J. Winder (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Respondents John
C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp

Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership;
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a
Utah general partnership,
Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT
vs.
AND
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. C87-1621
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT FELTON; LEON H.
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; KENNETH R. NORTON dba
INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC.,

nnm

and PAUL H. LANDES, individually; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership,
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

This

cause

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable

J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29,
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the defendants

John C.

and Geraldine

Y. Sharp

(hereinafter

the

"Sharps'1) appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F.
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enterprises,
Felton
Land

Leon H.

Saunders

(hereinafter

"Saunders"),

Robert

(hereinafter "Felton"), J, Richard Rees and Saunders

Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M.

Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord.

Counterclaim

defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his
counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendant Norton.
in this action.

Defendant Associated Title was never served
Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-

inafter "Landes") was never served in this action.
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, having reviewed and received exhibits, having heard the arguments
of counsel, having received stipulations of counsel, having
reviewed memoranda presented by counsel, having presented its
oral ruling on the issues involved in the case- on March 30,
-2-

1988, having heard and ruled upon the Plaintiffs' Objections
to Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Plaintiffs' Proposed Alternate and Additional Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon Plaintiffs' Objection
to Affidavit in Support of Request for Attorneys' Fees (including a similar motion filed by Norton) on September 16,
1988, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes and enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about December 9, 1980, Leon H. Saunders,

Robert Felton, Norton and Paul H. Landes entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter "Earnest
Money") with the Sharps for the purchase of certain real property located in White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Summit County,
State of Utah (hereinafter "the Subject Property").

(Exhibit

14).
2.

Plaintiffs' "development plans presently anticipated

12 to 15 four-acre to five-acre lots" and the Earnest Money
provided

"such

plans

shall

be

subject

to

the

reasonable

approval of Seller [the Sharps]."
3.

The Earnest Money also provided, inter alia:
At a time desired by Seller, Purchaser
shall allow Seller to hook into the
culinary water system and sewer system
developed by Purchaser on the subject
Property at the same per-hook-up price
charged by Purchaser to the buyers of
lots developed on the subject Property.

4.

The plaintiffs acted upon the understanding that be-

fore Summit County

would

approve
-3-

any planned development,

ooon

they, as the developer, must provide to Summit County for
approval an environmental impact statement, a plat map and, if
a planned residential development, a declaration of protective
covenants.

The Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District

("SBSID") required all sewer design improvements be approved
and construction must receive final approval.
5.

Plaintiffs wanted to promptly develop the Subject

Property and anticipated the approval process would be completed by June, 1981.
6.

Prior to closing the transaction which was the sub-

ject of the Earnest Money, a Shared Water System Cost Estimate
was prepared for Saunders by J. J. Johnson & Associates, engineers in Park City.

The Estimate proposed two alternatives

wherein 15 units at Saunders Ranch (subsequently White Pine
Ranches), known herein as the "Subject Property", develop a
water system sufficient for its needs and the needs of various
adjacent properties in order to provide users of the water
system an economy of scale resulting in lower water system
costs to each user.

(Exhibit 105).

Although considered by

him, Saunders never adopted any of these proposals.
7.

In April, 1981, an Environmental Impact Statement

(hereinafter "EIS") was prepared by J. J. Johnson for Saunders
Land Investment Corporation concerning development of the Subject Property and was delivered to the Sharps prior to closing.

(Exhibit 67).
8.

The EIS provided the "sewer system will be connected

to the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District and a line
-4-

extension agreement with the Sewer Improvement District will
be signed-" The EIS also provided two alternative water storage systems for the development on the Subject Property which
would be available to other proposed developments, including
Ranch Place and Landmark Plaza, as well.

The EIS further pro-

vided that the internal traffic circulation in the subject
project would be via private road.
9.

In April 1981, Felton, Norton, Saunders and Landes

operated

under

the

assumed

name

of

White

Pine Ranches-

(Plaintiffs' Complaint, H I and 5).
10. Thereafter, on or about July 16, 1981, the parties
closed the sale of the Subject Property through the execution
of a Memorandum of Closing Terms

(Exhibit 15) executed by

Saunders, Felton, Norton, Landes and the Sharps; a Special
Warranty Deed (Exhibit 17) executed by the Sharps and conveying the title to the Subject Property

to Landes, Felton,

Saunders and Interstate Rentals, Inc.; a Trust Deed Note executed

by Felton, Saunders, Landes, Norton and Interstate

Rentals, Inc. by its president, Norton, in the amount of
$963,055.30, together with an addendum to the Trust Deed Note
(Exhibit 3) outlining the Schedule of payments, and a Trust
Deed

covering

the

Subject

Property

executed

by Saunders,

Landes, Felton and Interstate Rentals, Inc. by its president,
Norton, and securing the Trust Deed Note (Exhibit 2) (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Closing Documents").
11.

A partnership

agreement establishing White Pine

Ranches was executed September 25, 1982 with Felton, Saunders,
-5-

i\rkf\r?

Dan Hunter and J. Richard Rees as general partners.
49).

(Exhibit

Saunders Land Investment Corporation subsequently as-

sumed and bought out the interest of Dan Hunter in the White
Pine Ranches partnership.
12.

On June 30, 1982 White Pine Ranches and Howells In-

vestment executed a Partnership Agreement of White Pine Enterprises for the purposes of "investing in, managing, leasing,
developing, subdividing

and

selling

unimproved

real estate

(Exhibit 48) described on Exhibit rA' attached" thereto, which
unimproved real estate was the approximately 27 southern acres
of the Subject Property that was never platted.
13.

Both partnerships, White Pine Ranches and White Pine

Enterprises, are general partnerships.
14.

Preliminary plats (Exhibits 18 and 19) of the Sub-

ject Property were prepared by J. J. Johnson & Associates for
the development prior to closing, but were modified by plaintiffs because the County Commission was opposed to the private
road concept.

(Exhibit 109).

These preliminary plats were

not approved prior to closing because the County Attorney
would not approve a private road system (Exhibit 114). A new
plat was prepared for White Pine Ranches, a Planned Unit Development

("PUD") and attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo-

randum of Closing Terms.

This Exhibit "A" to the Memorandum

of Closing Terms platted all of the Subject Property and was
initialed by all the parties thereto except Felton. (Exhibit
20).
15. Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms (Exhibit 15) provided as follows:
-6-

1.
It is mutually agreed and
understood that after recordation of
the PUD Plat and the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions,
and upon receipt of each $140,000-00 in
principal
(but not
including
the
earnest money and down payment money),
Seller shall execute and deliver to
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance
for one (1) PUD lot. (Emphasis added.)
16. Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided as follows:
2.
Upon the payment of the
release price, Buyer shall be entitled
to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice upon receipt of the payment
or at any time thereafter.
(Emphasis
added.)
17. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided as follows:
3. It is agreed that, at the time
of execution of this Memorandum, Buyer
has paid
to Seller
the
sum of
$620,000.00 which will release from the
Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. Upon
the recordation of the PUD Plat and
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions
and Restrictions with the Summit County
Recorder, Buyer shall be entitled to
the release from the Deed of Trust of
three (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice
together with the said roadway.
(Emphasis added.)
18. Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided as follows:
5. The proposed plat is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference incorporated herein.
Seller

-7-

hereby acknowledges and agrees to execute as a lienholder the original plat
prior to recordation. Changes in the
proposed plat and the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions
when prepared shall be subject to the
reasonable approval of Seller.
(Emphasis added.)
19. The proposed plat, Exhibit MA" attached to the Memorandum of Closing Terms included a boundary description describing all of the Subject Property and an Owner's Dedication.

The Owner's Dedication is a standard printed form used

by J.J. Johnson, parallels dedications used in the city limits
of Park City and is commonly used in plats to dedicate roads
to public use, not as a dedication for a private road as originally contemplated in the EIS.

The Owner's Dedication pro-

vides in pertinent part as follows:
Know all by these present that we the
undersigned owners of the herein described tract of land, having caused
the same to be subdivided into lots
and streets to hereafter be known as
White Pine Ranches Subdivision, do
hereby dedicate for perpetual use of
the public all parcels of land shown
on this plat as intended for public
use, and do warrant, defend, and save
the city harmless against any easements or other encumbrances on the
dedicated streets which will interfere
with the city's use, operation, and
maintenance of the streets and do further dedicate the easements as shown.
(Emphasis added.)
(Exhibit 20).
20. Paragraph 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided in part as follows:
6. Seller agrees to grant to Summit County the ten and one-half (10-

1/2) foot strip of land outlined in
red on Exhibit "A". Said conveyance
shall be for the sole purpose of
widening the County roadway. If possible, such grant shall be in the form
of an easement. The County indicates
that it is possible that the County
road as it exists is not where it is
platted.
21. The County roadway has not been widened, there are no
current plans to do so, and Summit County has never requested
such an easement from plaintiffs or the Sharps.

(See Exhibit

107, p. 15; Exhibit 87, p. 8; and Exhibit 34).
22. Paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided in pertinent part as follows:
7. Buyer agrees to provide Seller
with one (1) sewer connection and one
(1) culinary water connection into 3uver' s svstems at such time as each is
available, and Seller shall pay a connection fee and service fee equal to
the pro rata cost to the purchaser of a
lot in Buyer's proposed PUD plus any
charges of Summit Water Distributing
Company. The sewer and water connection granted above can be used by Seller in new construction if allowed on
the 8.5 acre parcel or for connection
to the existing residence of Seller....
(Emphasis added.)
23. Subsequent to closing, attorney Jon Heaton represented Saunders in continuing plaintiffs1 attempts, begun prior to
closing, to obtain County approval of a private road for the
development.

(Exhibit 127).

24. Before signing the Closing Documents, on June 16,
1981 and subsequently on November 1, 1983, Plaintiff White
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Pine Ranches entered into sewer extension agreements with the
SBSID to install a sewer trunk line up White Pine Canyon pursuant to which agreements White Pine Ranches would receive
reimbursement for their construction costs of the sewer line
to the development from connection fees charged to third parties connecting to that line:
Said third parties will be allowed to
connect to such lines only upon payment
to the District of the applicable number of connection fees. The District
shall retain $100 plus the actual costs
of construction and inspection from
each such connection fee and pay the
balance of each such connection fee to
Applicant [White Pine Ranches].
(Exhibits 80 115(c) and 81 55C) .
25. At the time plaintiffs were trying to obtain County
approval of the development and agreeing to run the sewer line
to Subject Property, it was anticipated that additional developments by third parties would occur in the White Pine Canyon
vicinity, including the development of a ski resort in White
Pine Canyon and the development of adjoining parcels of land,
all of which future developments would hook into the sewer
trunk line plaintiffs were to construct, allowing plaintiffs
the opportunity to recoup expenditures for the sewer system
through the connection fees paid pursuant to the provisions of
the line extension agreements.

(Exhibits 104, 105, 107 and

117) .
26. On June 30, 1982, White Pine Ranches paid the Sharps
the installment payment of $308,177.69, by check (Exhibit 44)
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enclosed with a cover letter from Felton stating:

"Upon final

plat approval, we will notify you to obtain the releases for
the lots and the road as per the contract."
27. On June

(Exhibit 21).

28, 1983 and June 30, 1983, Felton and

Saunders Land Investment Corporation paid to the Sharps the
sum of $178,165.23 by two checks in the amount of $71,266.09
and $106,899.14 respectively.

(Exhibit 44).

The remaining

portion of the June 30, 1983 installment payment due from
plaintiffs,

a

check

from

Dan

Hunter

in

the

amount

of

$106,849.14 was returned for insufficient funds, resulting in
a default in the June 30, 19823 installment payment.

(Exhibit

22) .
28. On or about July 19, 1983, while the June 30, 1983
payment was in default and prior to the recordation of a final
plat on the Subject Property, Felton wrote a letter to attorney Jon Heaton, inquiring about obtaining a release from the
Sharps of the road and five lots.

The letter further ex-

plained that a final plat had not been recorded because "[a]s
soon as we file the plat real estate taxes are going to go up
significantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an
actual buyer for one of the lots." (Exhibit 23).
29. On or about September 23, 1983, a Notice of Default
was filed pursuant to the Trust Deed on the Subject Property
for the default in the June 30, 1983 payment.

(Exhibit 24.)

30. Plaintiffs made no claim during 1983 that the Sharps
had breached the Closing Documents.
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31. On or about November 14, 1983, the June 30, 1983 default under the Trust Deed was cured with a payment in the sum
of $118,397.39 from Saunders Land Investment Corporation (Exhibits 4 and 44).
32. On or about November 18, 1983, attorney Jon Heaton
sent a letter to the Sharps enclosing for their approval a
proposed

final plat, which was later recorded with Summit

County (hereinafter the proposed "final plat"), and a Declaration of Protective Covenants (hereinafter "CCRs"), which Declaration was prepared on behalf of Saunders by Heaton and
which contained covenants, conditions and restrictions for use
of respecting a portion of the Subject Property by lot owners.
(Exhibit 25).
33. The proposed final plat enclosed with the November 18,
1983 letter did not plat the entire approximately 60 acre parcel as originally contemplated in the Earnest Money and the
Memorandum of Closing Terms, but platted only the northern
portion of the Subject Property into six PUD lots, leaving the
southern portion (approximately 27 acres) of the Subject Property unplatted (hereinafter the "unplatted acreage").

(Exhib-

it 1) .
34. The proposed final plat included an Ownerfs Dedication for a private road in the PUD and delineated the existence and location of the private road and certain utility
easements, including easements for water lines, water tank and
water systems.

(Exhibit 1).
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35. The November 18, 1983 letter from attorney Jon Heaton
to the Sharps further provided in pertinent part that:
At a later time in the near future, Hy
[Saunders] has indicated he will seek
release of Lots 1 through 5 of the
platted subdivision along with his road
(White Pine Lane)....
We will handle
that matter when it is presented....
When those releases are made, pursuant
to your instruction we will insure that
rights are reserved in White Pine Lane
for access for the southern portions of
the property purchased from you until
your Deed of Trust is fully paid. (Emphasis added.)
(Exhibit 25 and 25a).
36. On or about November 21, 1983, Felton mailed a letter
to Jon Heaton regarding the November 18, 1983 letter to John
Sharp.

The letter provided in pertinent part:

"It is per-

fectly acceptable to us that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an easement
over White Pine Lane to the southern part of his property as
well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road up to the western
boundary of Lot 6."

(Exhibit 26).

37. On or about November 28, 1983, Felton had a telephone
conversation with attorney Heaton memorialized

by notes of

attorney Heaton in the margin of Felton's November 21, 1983
letter

(Exhibit 26) .

Felton agreed that "access over road

[White Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops undeveloped property Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch."

(Exhibit 26a).

38. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps authorized
the recording of a Cancellation of Notice of Default relating
to the June 30, 1983 payment (Exhibit 27).

-13-

39. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps, in consideration of the agreement of plaintiffs to allow them access
over the private roadway (White Pine Lane) in the event of
foreclosure, and pursuant to their right of approval under
paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms, also executed
a Consent to Record Phase I of White Pine Ranches, which Consent after setting forth the metes and bounds description of
Phase I of White Pine Ranches granted:
[A] non-exclusive easement for water
lines, water tank and water systems
over, under and across the property,
shown here near the southwest corner of
the subject property, and specifically
described in the Declaration of Protective Covenants and reserving unto
the owners, for granting to the owners
of adjacent or nearby property, a^
non-exclusive easement for utilities
and vehicular and pedestrian access
over the private roadway shown on the
plat and from the well sites as developed. (Emphasis added.)
(Exhibit 51) .

As additional consideration for signing the

Consent to Record, the Sharps permitted the platting of only a
portion of the Subject Property.
40. The proposed final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I
sent to the Sharps for approval on November 18, L983 was recorded on December 23, 1983 in the office of the Summit County
Recorder following the execution of the Consent to Record by
the Sharps.

(Exhibit 1). The CCRs were also recorded in the

office of the Summit County Recorder on December 23, 1983 and
the Consent to Record was attached
(Exhibit 51) .
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as an exhibit thereto.

41. After recordation of the final plat, .the CCRs and the
Consent to Record, plaintiffs proceeded with construction of
the improvements on the Subject Property.

However, instead of

adopting any of the alternatives described in Finding No. 6,
supra, plaintiffs constructed a small, private water system
for this development.
42. On or about January 18, 1984, the Sharps executed a
direction to the Trustee under the Deed of Trust to release
from the Deed of Trust Lots 1 through 5 of White Pine Ranches
(Exhibit 28).
43. The Partial Reconveyance of Lots 1 through 5 directed
and authorized by the Sharps, was not prepared by Associated
Title, the trustee under the Trust Deed, until January 7, 1986
and was recorded March 26, 1986 (Exhibit 45). No explanation
of the delay in preparing the Partial Reconveyance was provided at trial.

Plaintiffs, although naming Associated Title as

a defendant in this action, chose not to serve or pursue and
question Associated Title for such delay.

No other request

for reconveyance was authorized by the Sharps.
44. On or about January 20, 1984, Felton sent a letter to
attorney Heaton expressing astonishment that the deeds to Lots
1 through 5 had not been received but stating, "I realize that
the deeds for the road may be difficult to do."

(Exhibit 30).

45. On or about January 17, 1984, Felton sent a letter to
attorney Heaton requesting the approval by the Sharps of a
"multi-family development" on the unplatted acreage, "which is
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the only way it [the development] will be economically feasible."

(Exhibit 29). A multi-family concept was never adopt-

ed.
46. Felton testified at trial and affirmed on May 7, 1986
in a letter sent to the Sharps that the plaintiffs "were in a
position to prepare and obtain approval of that plat [for the
unplatted acreage] immediately."

(Trial Transcript, p. 110,

hereinafter "R." 110 and Exhibit 37).
47. It was the actual practice of plaintiffs and a requirement of paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms to
make specific requests for the release of specific PUD lots
from the Sharps after required payments were made and provided
no defaults existed under the Closing Documents.

(R. 334).

48. Property taxes on the unreleased property (Lot 6 and
the unplatted acreage) became delinquent pursuant to law on
November 30, 1984 when plaintiffs failed to pay all of the
1984 property taxes due on- the Subject Property (Stipulation
of counsel at Trial) in violation of paragraphs 5 and 14 of
the Trust Deed, which provided in paragraph 5 that the Trustor
[plaintiffs] agrees "to pay at least 10 days before delinquency

all taxes

and

assessments

affecting

said property...."

(Exhibit 2).
49. Except for $1,515.24 in property taxes paid on the
unplatted acreage in 1984, no taxes have been paid on the
unreleased Subject Property (Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage)
subsequent to November 30, 1984, and including 1985, 1986 and
1987 (Stipulation of counsel at Trial), and plaintiffs, there-16-

fore, remained in default under the provisions of paragraphs 5
and 14 of the Trust Deed,
50• Plaintiffs paid the 1984 installment payment.

However,

on or about June 27, 1985, the Sharps received only a portion
of the June 30, 1985 installment payment in the form of a
check from Felton in the amount of $59,709-47 (Exhibit 44).
51. As a result of plaintiffs' defaults, a Notice of
Default was recorded on September 16, 1985 covering the Subject Property as described in the Trust Deed, which description included Lots 1-5.
52.

On

or

about

(Exhibit 55).
September

24, 1985, Felton

sent a

letter to Mr. Sharp acknowledging receipt of the September
1985 Notice of Default and assuring him "every attempt is being made to resolve the problem...."

(Exhibit 31). Felton,

in his letter made no allegation that the Sharps had slandered
plaintiffs' title as a result of the inclusion of Lots 1-5 in
the Notice of Default nor did Felton or any other plaintiff
allege in 1984 or 1985 any breach of Closing Documents by the
Sharps.
53. Significantly, as bearing upon the credibility of
plaintiffs' arguments is the fact unrebutted that plaintiffs
made no claims whatsoever of breach by the Sharps until after
their own admitted breaches of the Closing Documents.

(Ex-

hibit 31) .
54. On or about January 10, 1986, Felton wrote a letter
to Blake G. Heiner of Associated Title Company, the Trustee
under the Trust Deed, informing him that the Notice of Default
-17-

(Exhibit 55) and Amended Notice of Sale (Exhibit 56) covering
the Subject Property included Lots 1 through 5 which were to
have been released, pursuant to the Sharps' direction.

(Ex-

hibit 57) .
55. In response to Felton's letter (Exhibit 57), Blake
Heiner for Associated Title Company prepared and recorded an
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale against the Subject Property,
excluding Lots 1 through 5.

(Exhibit 58).

Other Notices

filed subsequently against the Subject Property also excluded
Lots 1 through 5.
56.

All

of

(Exhibits 3 and 36).
the

Notices

of

Default

and

Notices

of

Trustee's Sale recorded against the Subject Property specifically provided that such Notices are:
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments,
Restrictions, Rights-of-Way and matters
of record enforceable in law (sic)
equity.
(Exhibits 5, 36, 55, 56, and 58).
57. No payment at all was made when the final installment under the Closing Documents was due on June 30, 1986.
58. The balance owing to the Sharps under the Trust Deed
Note

through

March

22,

J.988

is

$557,642.46,

including

$371,739.35 principal; $23,113.33 interest at 12%; $147,920.21
default interest at 18%; and $14,869.52 late payment charges
of 4% on each overdue payment.
diem rate of $183.32.

Interest is accruing at a per

(Exhibit 122).

59. Plaintiffs made no written or oral request for the
release of the roadway or Lot 6 prior to their default in
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November 1984, when the 1984 property taxes became delinquent,
and prior to their default in failing to make the entire 1985
installment payment when due.

Plaintiffs' first requests were

made for such releases on February 27, 1986 and May 7, 1986,
respectively.

(Exhibits 35 and 37). Also for the first time

in the letter dated February 27, 1986, plaintiffs requested a
release from the Sharps for 7.5 acres of the unplatted acreage, despite the provision in paragraphs 1-3 of the Memorandum
of Closing Terms for the release by the Sharps of "PUD lots"
only.

As of these dates, plaintiffs were still and are in of

default for the 1984 and 1985 property taxes and the payment a
portion of the 1985 payment and the full 1986 payment required
under the Addendum to the Trust Deed Note.
60. The Sharps perceived that the execution by them of
the Consent to Record constituted substantial performance of
any obligation to release the roadway pursuant to paragraphs 3
and 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms.
61. As plaintiff Felton testified, "the contract [Memorandum of Closing Terms] says lots of buyer's choice and that
would

require a choice."

After the release of Lots 1-5,

plaintiffs may have chosen to prepare a plat of the then unplatted acreage and seek a release of a portion of it instead
of Lot 6.
62. Also in the letter of February 27, 1986, Felton demanded

from

the

Sharps

for

the

first

time

approximately

$73,000.00 as their "cost of the sewer and water hook-ups
which are now available."

(Exhibit 35). No demand for such
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costs had been made of the Sharps prior to that time nor had
plaintiffs provided

an accounting

of such costs.

Before

trial, plaintiffs claimed exorbitant expenses of $1,638,753.61
for the complete costs for the construction of the improvements on and to the Subject Property (Exhibit 32a).
63. At trial, plaintiffs claimed costs for the construction

of

improvements

on

and

to

the

Subject

Property

of

$1,063,348.10, (Exhibit 60) and plaintiffs modified their demand from the Sharps for water and sewer connection fees to
$43,706.00.

(Exhibit

66).

64. Prior to actual construction of the sewer system,
Saunders

told

the Summit County

Planning

Commission

in a

meeting on December 14, 1982 that they "would really like to
have the septic tank system used because of the high cost of
the sewer line but in the long run it may be the best way to
go."

(Exhibit 79).

On or about September 16, 1983, Felton

wrote Summit County challenging the requirement "to install a
sewer

line up

the County road from Highway U-224

to the

Project, a distance of about one and one-half (1-1/2) miles."
(Exhibit 79). Felton concluded the letter by declaring:

"In

the event we are required to install the sewer line, we will
test the validity of that requirement in court."
65. Plaintiffs made formal demand upon Summit County on
or about July 26, 1984 for, inter alia, the following damages:
The sum of $117,297.15 being the
costs of off-site sewer which we
were, under protest, required to
install to service the subdivision.
* **
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[W]e [plaintiffs] have lost one sale or
more sales and anticipate the damages,
loss of profit and interest at between
$250,000 and $500,000.
***

[D]amages for the loss of sale, reduction
in business and damages suffered in reduction to profit ....
(Exhibit 84).
66.

Soon thereafter plaintiffs brought suit in the United

States District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. C84-2090W,
against Summit County, the SBSID and various officials thereof
to recover their claimed damages.
67. In answer to interrogatories dated December 28, 1984
in the Federal Court litigation, plaintiffs stated:
Because of the imposition of the requirement that Plaintiffs construct an
off-site sewer approximately one mile in
length, the costs of developing the
entire project became prohibitive.
(Exhibit 116; see also, Exhibit 107, p. 7).
68. In further interrogatory answers on March 31, 1986,
Saunders declared:
At the present time I have recently found
out that the right-of-way servicing my
property has been forfeited by Summit
County contrary to law. This will not
allow my development to proceed, will not
allow me to recover costs for the capital
improvement and significantly diminishes
the value of the property.
(Exhibit 107, p. 15).
69. In Saunders' Federal Court affidavit dated March 17,
1986, he also swore:
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10.
As a result of the various
delays [caused by the County and the
SBSID], which are detailed below, the
market for exclusive building lots is now
virtually non-existent, cost of improvements escalated to be several times what
I had anticipated, and much of the real
property in the project is threatened by
foreclosure.
(Exhibit 86, p. 3).
70. Most of the damages sought to be recovered by the
plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the SBSID and Summit County
are the same damages plaintiffs sought to recover from the
Sharps in the present case.

(R. 252 and 263; cf. Exhibits 60

with 86; see also Exhibits 87, 88, 107, 116 and Plaintiffs1
Verified Complaint herein).
71. No written or oral claim of default on the part of
the Sharps under the Closing Documents was made by the plaintiffs until February 27, 1986, subsequent to plaintiffs1 own
defaults in failing to pay the 1984 and 1985 property taxes
and failing to pay the full 1985 payment required under the
Addendum to the Trust Deed Note.
72.

The

Sharps

did

not

interfere

with

plaintiffs'

attempts to market or sell the Subject Property.
73. Plaintiffs received only one invitation for an offer
to purchase Lot 1 or Lot 6, which invitation was not consummated due to the failure of conditions imposed by the one,
B. F. Sammons, and the failure of such conditions were unrelated to any actions or statements of the Sharps.
88) .
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(Exhibit

74. One of the conditions of purchase by Sammons was an
independent appraisal supporting
price (Exhibit 88).

a $220,000 proposed sales

The plaintiffs provided Sammons with a

letter appraisal, dated August 8, 1986, which had been prepared by LeRoy Pia.

(Exhibit 9a). This appraisal stated that

Lots 1 and 6 had a fair market value of $220,000.

On or

about November 11, 1986, while Sammons and Saunders were still
negotiating, a letter appraisal was obtained by Steve Clyde,
attorney for the plaintiffs from the same appraiser, valuing
the lots at an average of only $190,000.00 (Exhibit 9). The
November 11, 1986 appraisal was not shown to Sammons.

(R.

283-4).
75.

Saunders

had

given

Sammons

"the impression" that

plaintiffs could convey Lot 6 to him even though it had not
been released from the Trust Deed.

(R. 389; see also R. 284).

76. On or about March 24, 1987, Felton, pursuant to the
request of the real estate agent, Steve Clegg, employed by
plaintiffs to list Lots 1, 2 and 5, wrote a letter to Clegg
for dissemination to other Park City real estate agents, which
letter stated "[t]he current litigation does not affect the
marketability or encumber that [Subject] property."

(Exhibit

89.)
77. After the commencement of this action, the Sharps
took all reasonable steps to facilitate the sale and marketing
of the Subject Property as evidenced by a letter dated September 30, 1986, to plaintiffs' prior attorney, Steven Clyde, who
was notified by Donald J. Winder, the Sharps' attorney, that
-23-

the Sharps would take all steps reasonable to effect a sale of
Lot 6 or the unplatted acreage (Exhibit 33), and the Sharps1
Motion to Appoint a Receiver for the Subject Property in this
proceeding dated May 14, 1987.
78. There have been no arms length sales to purchasers of
PUD lots at the Subject Property wherein sewer and water connection and service fees have been assessed.

The only convey-

ance of a PUD lot has been to Felton, a member of bhe partnerships.

At trial, plaintiffs testified that they intended, at

all times, to include the cost of the sewer and water connection and service fees within the sales price of lots.

(R.

310-312)•
79. Mr. Sammons was not to be charged any sum above and
beyond a $220,000 land price for sewer or water connection
fees.

(R. 285).
80. Felton testified that a purchaser of one of the PUD

lots listed with real estate agent Clegg would only be charged
"over and above ... the purchase price" "the hook-up fee to be
charged by Snyderville Basin for sewer."

(R. 310).

81. If plaintiffs sold a lot to Sammons at $220,000, they
would not have been "compensated for those [sewer and water]
improvement costs...." At a $220,000 sales price it's "impossible" to recover the costs of sewer and water improvements to
the Subject Property.

"You have to take a loss,"

(R. 311-

312).
82. The sewer system, as of the date of trial, is not
completed

or

operational,

nor
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has

its

construction

been

approved by the SBSID.

(Exhibits 83, 83a and 99 through 103).

The culinary water system as of the date of trial is also not
operational.

Under paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing

Terms, the Sharps do not have to pay connection fees for these
systems until they are "available."

(Exhibit 15).

83. The sewer system constructed

by plaintiffs has a

capacity to handle between 2,000 and 3,800 connections.

(Ex-

hibit 86) .
84. Under the line extension agreements with the SBSID, a
connection fee "at the rate in effect at the time of connection" shall be determined by the SBSID for the system on the
Subject

Property

(Exhibit

it 80, paragraph 4(d)).

81,

paragraph

4D;

see

Exhib-

The "connection fee shall be paid by

the property owner" before issuance of a building permit, to
the

Application

(the plaintiffs

herein),

except

that the

SBSID, shall be entitled to "the first $100 of the connection
fee."
85. The parties
Money concerning
with

intended

the language in the Earnest

"same per-hook-up price" to be synonymous

the language contained

in paragraph 7, Memorandum of

Closing Terms, regarding "pro rata cost" to a PUD lot purchaser.
86. Average and reasonable connection fees for culinary
water and sewer systems in the Park City and Snyderville Basin
area are $2,000.00 each.

(See Testimony of John C. Brown and

Rex Ausburn, cf. Exhibit 86, p. 6).
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87. The Sharps intended and wanted to be charged only
what purchasers of a PUD lot would be charged as fees to connect to the culinary water and sewer systems on the Subject
Property, and the plaintiffs should have understood that this
was the intent of paragraph 7, Memorandum of Closing Terms.
88. The Sharps repeatedly assured plaintiffs that they
did not intend, through their foreclosure, to interfere with
access rights over the private roadway or to the utility easements shown on the Consent to Record which the Sharps signed.
(R. 64; Exhibits 33 and 51; cf. Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a).
89. Correspondingly, it was both the mutual intent and
agreement of the parties that the Sharps be granted use of the
roadway in event of default (Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a),
which agreement was later memorialized and recorded in the
Consent to Record.

(Exhibit 51).

90. The inclusion of Lots 1 through 5 in the September
1985 Notice of Default (Exhibit 55) and December 1985 Amended
Notice of Trustee's Sale

(Exhibit 56) was inadvertent, un-

intentional and without malice.
91. In refusing to reconvey Lot 6, the road, the unplatted acreage, the Sharps acteci in good faith and relied on the
advice of attorney Jon Heaton.
92.

The

Sharps

have

been

charged

trustees1

fees by

Associated Title in their efforts to foreclose the Subject
Property in the amount of $1,803.80 (Exhibit 42).
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93- Plaintiffs have not suffered any damages, special or
otherwise, as a result of any act or failure to act by the
Sharps.
94. Paragraph 13 of the Trust Deed provides that failure
to promptly enforce any right thereunder does "not constitute
a waiver of any other right or subsequent default."

(Exhibit

2) .
95. On September 4, 1986, the day before the scheduled
Trustee's Sale, plaintiffs filed a Complaint commencing this
action and obtained the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order

(TRO) from Judge Judith M. Billings to restrain the

Sharps from conducting the Trustee's Sale of the Subject Property.

The TRO required a bond in the amount of $2,400.

In a

hearing held on January 4, 1988, this Court required that the
bond be increased to $50,000 "to protect the Sharps for the
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered if the Sharps are found to have been wrongfully enjoined
or restrained...."
96. The Trust Deed Note provided that if it "is collected
by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or
interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned ...
agree to pay ... a reasonable attorney's fee."
Paragraph

16

of

the

Trust

Deed

provided:

(Exhibit 3).,
"Upon

the

occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary [the Sharps]
shall have the option to ... foreclose the Trust Deed ... and
Beneficiary

shall be entitled
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to recover

... a reasonable

*-**xcv

attorney's fee...."

(Exhibit 2; see also All thereof).

Fur-

ther, paragraph 6 of the Trust Deed provided that Beneficiary
(the Sharps) may "commence, appear in and defend any action or
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the
rights of [sic] powers of Beneficiary . . . and in exercising
any such powers ... employ counsel, and pay his reasonable
fees."

Additionally, paragraph 7 of the Trust Deed requires

Trustor to "pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest from
date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per
annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured
hereby."

Paragraph 11 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-

vided that "the defaulting party shall pay all expenses of
enforcing the same or any right arising out of breach or default thereof, including reasonable attorneys' fees, whether
incurred with or without suit and both before and after judgment."

(Exhibit 15).

97. Legal services have been rendered to the Sharps by
the law firm of Winder & Haslam in the nature of time expended
by individual members, through August 31, 1988, in the amount
of $144,469.75.
98. The foregoing amount does not include any services
performed on or after August 31, 1988, including those services of Winder & Haslam necessary for finalizing the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and preparing for, responding to and arguing any post trial motions.
fees for such matters may be supplemented later.
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The legal

99. The services rendered by the law firm of Winder &
Haslam, excluding legal research related to attorney's malpractice, were reasonably necessary for the development of the
case and protection of the rights of the Sharps; and the rates
charged are reasonable and are in accordance with those rates
generally charged by attorneys in this area for similar services.
100. Plaintiffs breached the Memorandum of Closing Terms
by, inter alia, failing to make the payments intended thereby
to the Sharps and by failing to make available sewer and water
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot.
101. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Closing
Terms, all "agreements contained [t]herein shall survive the
closing of this transaction...."

(Exhibit 15).

102. The Sharps* defense of plaintiffs1 Complaint was an
action purporting to affect the security under the Trust Deed
and the rights and powers of the Sharps; related to collecting
the Promissory Note after default; related to foreclosing the
Trust Deed; and related to enforcing the Memorandum of Closing
Terms and rights arising out of a breach or default thereof.
103. After closing the Sale on the Subject Property, on or
about July 16, 1981, attorney Heaton represented White Pine
Ranches relating to the development of the Subject Property
(R. 789) until the filing by Associated Title of a Notice of
Default on or about September 16, 1985.

(R. 836; Exhibit 55).

Attorney Heaton did not represent the Sharps between the closing of the sale and the filing of the first Notice of Default
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on or about September 23, 1983.

(R. 791; Exhibit 24). For a

period of time after the filing of the first Notice of Default
on or about September 23, 1983, and

after the filing of the

Notice of Default on September 16, 1985 (R. 793), attorney
Heaton did represent the Sharps.
104. The Sharps have incurred costs of court in this action.
Having made the above Findings of Fact, the Court herewith makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Closing

Documents, which

term

is defined in

Finding No. 10 above, are the operative documents relating to
the parties' closing of the sale of the Subject Property by
the Sharps to the plaintiffs, and this transaction constitutes
the Contract between the parties (hereinafter the "Contract").
2. Plaintiffs, by their failure to pay the 1984, 1985,
1986 and 1987 property taxes on Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage on November 30 of each respective year, are thereby in
breach of the Trust Deed.
3. Plaintiffs' failure to pay the entire June 30, 1985
installment payment and the 30, 1986 final installment payment
required pursuant to paragraph ID and IE of the Addendum to
the Trust Deed Note constitutes a breach of the Trust Deed
Note, Trust Deed and Memorandum of Closing Terms.
4. Plaintiffs' breaches were material, significant and
continuing

and were

uncured

when plaintiffs

releases were

first requested by plaintiffs for the roadway and Lot 6 on
February 27, 1986 and again on May 7, 1986.
-30-

5. The breaches by plaintiffs of the Contract occurred
prior in time to any alleged breaches by the Sharps, and this
Court specifically holds there were no material or significant
breaches on the part of the Sharps of their obligations under
the parties1 Contract.
6. The Sharps have substantially complied with all of
their obligations under the terms of the parties' Contract.
7. Plaintiffs were obligated, under the terms of the
Memorandum of Closing Terms and pursuant to their own practice, to specifically request and identify lots, including Lot
6, for release by the Sharps.
8.

Because

the

plaintiffs'

material

and

continuing

breaches of the parties' Contract preceded timely plaintiffs'
requests for reconveyance of Lot 6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage, defendants were not obligated to reconvey Lot
6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage.
9. The Sharps were justified in and were excused from
performance under the Contract to reconvey Lot 6, the roadway
or the unplatted acreage shown on the final plat of to the
plaintiffs because the plaintiffs were in breach of the parties' Contract at the time such reconveyances were requested.
10. Alternatively, the Sharps' execution of the Consent
to Record the final plat of and the CCRs constituted a release
of the roadway shown on such plat in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms.
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11. The execution of the Consent to Record by the Sharps
and the subsequent recordation of the final plat and the CCRs
created a non-exclusive appurtenant easements to run with the
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and
benefit of the unplatted acreage and the owners and purchasers
thereof

(including the Sharps), and their invitees, guests,

heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and for access
to and the right to use as a means for ingress and egress for
vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and across the
private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final
plat, and a non-exclusive appurtenant easement to run with the
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and
benefit of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof

(including the Sharps) and their heirs and

successors in interest for water lines, water tank and water
systems over, under and across the Subject Property near the
southwest corner of the unplatted

acreage as shown on the

final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I.
12. The Sharps are estopped to deny the dedication of
White Pine Lane, pursuant to the final recorded plat, for the
private use of the parcel owners, their invitees and guests,
subject to the CCRs and the non-exclusive appurtenant easement
for the use and benefit of the unplatted acreage described in
Conclusion No. 11 above.

Further, the Sharps are estopped to
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deny the non-exclusive utility easement also described in Conclusion No. 11 above.
13. The Sharps, by the execution of the Consent to Record, are estopped to deny the operative and legal effect of
the recordation of the final plat and CCRs and the rights and
obligations of the owners of PUD lots as set forth in the recorded final plat and CCRs for White Pine Ranches Phase I.
The final recorded plat and CCRs and the non-exclusive easements set forth in Conclusion No. 11 above shall remain in
full force and effect, and not be affected by the foreclosure
ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's Sale, or a subsequent redemption of the subject premises, other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs herein coupled with
plaintiffs1

declaration for the extinguishment of the non-

exclusive easement in favor of the unplatted acreage.
14. Owners and purchasers of the unplatted acreage (including the Sharps), and their successors in interest are entitled to use of the private roadway

(White Pine Lane) for

access to the unplatted acreage of the Subject Property as set
forth in the legal description attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
and

incorporated

by reference herein, as a result of the

mutual intent and agreements between the parties to grant to
the Sharps the use of the roadway, which agreement was memorialized by the letters of Heaton and Felton and evidenced by
the part performance and

reliance of the Sharps on such let-

ters and agreements in executing the Consent to Record.

15. General partners m

a partnership are bound by the

actions of other partners taken on behalf of the partnership
and by the actions of the partnership itself.
16. The language in paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of
Closing Terms "pro rata cost to the purchaser" is ambiguous,
necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret the
same.
17.
strated

The extrinsic

evidence presented

at trial demon-

that the parties intended to allow the Sharps, at

their request, one connection each to both the culinary water
and sewer systems when and if such systems are available and
operational.
18. The construction costs of the culinary water and
sewer systems claimed by the plaintiffs are not reasonable, in
violation of the reasonable value rule.
19. Seven years is an unreasonable time within which to
complete the culinary water and sewer systems and require the
Sharps to mandatorily hook into these systems, which systems
still are not yet operational.

The Sharps are not obligated,

but have the option, to hook into the culinary water and sewer
systems should such systems become operational.
20. It is an unreasonable interpretation of the language
"pro rata costs" in the Memorandum of Closing Terms and the
earlier language in the Earnest Money delineating "the same
per-hook-up price" to require the Sharps to pay 1/13 of the
exorbitant construction costs for culinary water and sewer
hook-ups.

Such an interpretation would recast the Sharps as
-34-

developers rather than the mere sellers of Subject Property
that they were and intended to be in this transaction.
21. A reasonable fee to be paid by the Sharps to the
plaintiffs for a connection to the culinary water and sewer
systems is $2,000.00 each.
22. The inclusion of Lots 1-5 in the initial Notice of
Default

(Exhibit 55) and Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit

56) on behalf of the Sharps was inadvertent, unintentional and
without malice.
23. There was no improper holding by the Sharps of any
requested reconveyance, but even if there were, it was not
done in bad faith.

The Sharps acted in reliance on the advice

of their counsel, and did so in good faith.
24. Alternatively, the Sharps did not improperly withhold
reconveyances and plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause
of

action for

failure to reconvey

under

U.C.A. §57-1-33.

U.C.A. §57-1-33 is applicable only when a beneficiary refuses
to request a reconveyance within 30 days after written demand
therefor is made by the Trustor.

The Sharps requested the

Trustee to reconvey Lots 1-5 on or about January 18, 1984, and
because of plaintiffs' subsequent breaches were under no obligation to reconvey the remainder of the Subject Property.
25. As a result of plaintiffs1 breaches of the Contract,
the Sharps were entitled to record all of the Notices of Default and Notices of Sale described in the Findings against
the Subject Property.
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26. The Sharps acted in good faith and not maliciously in
having recorded the Notices of Default and the Notices of Sale
and in refusing to reconvey Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage.
27. The plaintiffs have not established a cause of action
for slander of title against the Sharps.

The Sharps did not

act maliciously or cause any special damages to the plaintiffs.
28. All of the damages, including, without limitation,
those under U.C.A. §57-1-33, claimed by the plaintiffs are too
remote, conjectural

and

speculative.

The plaintiffs have

failed to establish they have suffered actual damages resulting from any alleged breach by the Sharps, and this Court concludes no such breach by the Sharps occurred.
29. The attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps in this
matter through August 31, 1988 in the amount of $144,469.75
are
same.

reasonable and the Sharps are entitled to an award of the
Further, the Sharps are entitled to supplement and aug-

ment this amount by affidavit for their reasonable attorney's
fees incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of the
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any posttrial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution or
otherwise, and, if necessary, after prevailing on any appeal.
30. The Sharps are entitled to their costs of court in
the amount as assessed or taxed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54 and to
post-judgment interest as provided by law.
31. By virtue of the significant and material breaches of
the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Sharps are entitled to
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judgment against Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc.
and Norton, jointly and severally, in the following amounts:
a.

i.
ii.

iii.

Principal:

$

371,739.35

March 22, 1988:

$

171,033.54

Late payment charge:

$

14,869.57

TOTAL:

$

557,642.46

Interest through

together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988.
b.

i.
ii.
iii.

Trustee!s fees:

s

1,803.80

Court Costs:

$

2,881.04

$

144,088.75

Attorneys' fees through
August 31, 1988:

together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until
paid by plaintiffs.
c.

Delinquent property taxes:

$

20,368.62

together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and
post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum.
32. As a result of the significant and material breaches
of the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Temporary Restraining
Order entered in the above captioned matter by the Honorable
Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986 was wrongfully issued
and the Sharps are entitled to have it lifted and dissolved.
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33. The Sharps are entitled to be paid the bond posted by
plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986 in
the amount of $2,400 and to be paid from the security posted
by Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of $28,570.63 for their
interest, attorney's fees and other damages incurred as a result of the issuance of the wrongful Temporary Restraining
Order, and for which amounts the Sharps are not secured by the
fair market value of the Subject Property.
34. The Sharps are entitled to have Lot 6 as described in
the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the
unplatted property more particularly described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto or such portions thereof as may be sufficient
to pay the amounts found to be due and owing under the Judgment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and
accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, sold at public
auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in the
manner prescribed by law for such sales; that said Sheriff, if
and when the subject premises are sold by him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs, disbursements
and commission, and then pay to the Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, then said
sums for the Sharps' attorney's fees, and the amount owing to
the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale
and maintenance, taxes, assessments and/or insurance premiums,
together with accrued interest thereon, or so much of said
sums as said proceeds will pay, and that the surplus, if any,
shall be accounted for and paid over to the Clerk of this
-38-

Court subject to this Court's further order.
35. All persons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the right, upon producing satisfactory proof of
interest,

to redeem the same within the time provided by law

for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the
period

of redemption

above named,

as provided by law, that the plaintiffs

and each of them, and all persons claiming

by,

through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred
and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and
to the subject premises, and that from and after the delivery
of

the

Sheriff's

Deed

to

the

subject

premises

that

the

grantees named therein be given possession thereof.
36.

If a deficiency results after due and proper applica-

tion of the proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps
entitled

to be awarded

a personal judgment

against

are

Saunders,

Felton, Norton and Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them,
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency.
37.

The Sharps are entitled to have the right, at their

request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary water
and sewer systems on White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000 each.
38.

The Sharps are entitled to have the Complaint of the

plaintiffs dismissed, no cause of action.
DATED this

ffiytfay

of

^fc£

, 1988.

TTEST
ON HINDLEY
CkrK

DC7L-V C%.srk
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Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE RANCHES, a
Utah general partnerhip;
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a
Utah general partnership,

^ R . 3-^A no. a%3io

^-an-<&?>-%.cs

Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT

vs.
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. C87-1621
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
JOHN C SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT FELTON, LEON H.
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; KENNETH R. NORTON dba
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INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC.,
and PAUL H. LANDES, individually; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership,
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

This

cause

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable

J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29,
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the defendants

John C.

and

Geraldine Y. Sharp

(hereinafter

the

"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A, F.
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enterprises,
Felton
Land

Leon H.

Saunders

(hereinafter

"Saunders"),

Robert

(hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders

Investment Corporation appearing by counsel. Robert M.

Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord.
defendant Kenneth R. Norton

Counterclaim

("Norton") appeared through his

counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendant Norton.
in this action.

Defendant Associated Title was never served
Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-

inafter "Landes") was never served in this action.
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law,
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NOW

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-

that plaintiffs 1

CREED

complaint

be dismissed,

no cause

of

action.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of
the Sharps' reasonable attorney's fees as established by affidavit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Temporary Restraining Order entered

in the above captioned

matter by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4,
1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dissolved.

The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the

bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986 in the amount of $2,400.00 and against the security posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court
in the amount of $28,570.63, and for which amounts the plaintiffs are not secured by the fair market value of the subject
premises.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lot 6 as
described in the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches
Phase I and the unplatted property more particularly described
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State
of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales; that

004a
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Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the grantees named
therein be gi ven possession thereof.
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DECREED tl la t

application

If a

of the
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proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are hereby awarded
a

personal

judgment

against

Saunders, Felton, Norton

and

Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connection to both plaintiffs1 culinary water and sewer systems on
White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000
each.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a nonexclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude,
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto
and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and purchasers thereof

(including the Sharps) and their invitees,

guests, heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and
for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and
egress for vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and
across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with
the Summit County Recorder; and a non-exclusive appurtenant
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches
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B«<ginning a t a peine South 33 d e g r e e s 43'35* I7esc along tha
N o r t h l i n e of Lac 3, 17S„42 f e e t f r o n the e a s i e r ai Lacs I
and 3 , a b r a s s can s e c by t h e U.S. General Land O f f i c e , s a i d
b r a s s cap a l s o being South ao d e g r e e s 15*46* West along
s e c t i o n l i n e 1336.14 f e a t f r c a t h e Northeast.ccr::er of
S e c t i o n 1, Township 2 South, Hange 3 S a s t , Sale La&a 3 a s e
and M e r i d i a n ; and running thenca South 39 degrees 43«36 w
West a l o n g the North l i n e of Lot 7 and 3 2943.33 f e e t Co t h e
N o r t h w e s t corner of Loc 7; thence South 00 degrees 12*23*
Z a s t a l o n g the West l i n e of Loc 7, 1312.34 faeC t o t h e •
S o u t h w e s t • corner oi Loc 7; thence Kerch 32 degrees 47*41"
2 a s t a l o n g the Souch l i n e of Lot 7, 332.67 f a e t ; thence
N o r t h 61 degrees oa^O* l a s t 1355.90 i e e t ; thence North 47
d e g r e e s 3 3 ' I S " 2asc 462.75 f a e c ; t h e n c e North. 4^2 d e c r e e s
4 4 , 4 0 , f Z a s t 35.63 feec to the p o i n t of beginning.
LESS and excepting White Pins Zszdz&s, Phase I , a Planes! 3esicsnfiial
Development, according to the o f f i c i a l p l a t thereof on r i l e arc of
record i n the Siszmit County Seccrdsr's Offica, State of Utah.
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of defendants in an action for breach of contract and slander of title. Plaintiffs also appeal
the district court's determination that a ternlorary restraining order was wrongfully
Cite as
ssued, entitling defendants to damages from
135 Utah 4ch , Rep, 68
njunction bonds posted by, and on behalf of,
.llaintiffs. We affirm, the judgment on the
IN T H E
:ontract, but reverse the award of damages
' [ ) I 113 C O U R T O F I P P E \ I S
against the injunction bonds.
This dispute arises from the sale of approLeon H. SAUNDERS; Robert Feiton;
ximately 60 acres of land near Park City,
Saunders Land Investment Corporation, a
Utah, owned by John C. and Geraldine Y.
Utah corporation; White Pine Ranches, a
Sharp ("sellers"). Plaintiff White Pine
Utah general partnership; and White Pine
Ranches, a general partnership consisting of
Enterprises, a Utah general partnership,
Leon H. Saunders, Robert Feiton, Kenneth R.
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Norton, and Paul H. Landes ("buyers7'),
"i
purchased the property on July 16, 1981, for
John C. SHARP and Geraldine ¥. Sharp,
the purpose of constructing a "Planned Unit
Defendants and Appellees.
Development" (PUD)2 of four- or five-acre
lots and an internal roadway. Buyers paid
John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp,
$620,000 down on a total purchase price of
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs and Appellees
$1,583,055.30, and executed a trust deed and
v,
note providing for equal annual installment
Robert Feiton; Leon H. Saunders; Saunders
payments of $192,611.06 on the balance due.
Land Investment Corporation; White Pine
An "Offer to Purchase" and "Memorandum
Ranches; White Pine Enterprises,
if Closing Terms" were also executed
Counterclaim-Defendants and <Vppelk-r*>.
hereafter referred to as the "contract"), and
nciuded the following provisions: (1) upon
and
eceipt of the down payment and recordation
Kenneth R. N« »i ton. • I I: "a Interstate •
)f a "PUD Plat and Declaration of CovenRentals, Inc.,
ants, Conditions and Restrictions," three lots
Coun tercl ai in De fe n d ant a IM! I p pel II ai
of buyers1 choice together with the internal
and
roadway connecting the lots to the county
Commissioner of Financial Institutions,
"oad would be released from the trust deed;
receiver for Tracy Collins Bank and Trust
(2) after recordation and upon receipt of each
Company,
$140,000 in principal, one PUD lot of buyers'
Surety and Appellant.
choice would be released from the trust deed;
(3) sellers would grant Summit County a strip
No. 880710-C • i
of land to widen the county road, or, if the
road was shown to be inaccurately platted, to
No. 880711-CA
grant to the county the road as it existed; (4)
FILED: May 25, 1990
sellers would warrant marketable title subject
only to easements and reservations of record;
Third District, Salt Lake County
(5) buyers would provide sellers with a water
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
and sewer connection at a pro rata cost, at
such time as the connections became available;
ATTORNEYS:
(6) buyers would sell 50 acre-feet of irrigaRobert M. Anderson, Glen D. Watkins, and
tion water to sellers for the discounted cost of
Mark R. Gaylord, Salt Lake City, for
$100,000 cash; (7) buyers would be responsible
Plaintiffs
for all taxes and assessments after assuming
John B. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for
possession of the premises; (8) failure to make
Kenneth R. Norton
the annual installment payments within thirty
Stanford B. Owen and Patrick L \nderson.
days of the annual anniversary date would
Salt Lake City, for Surety
constitute a default; and (9) in the event of a
breach or default, the defaulting party would
Donald J. Winder, Kathy A.F. Davis, and
pay all expenses, including reasonable attorney
Tamara K. Prince, Salt Lake City, for
fees, incurred in enforcing any obligation or
Defendants
right under the contract.
Before Judges Bench Gi eenwood„ a nci
Buyers made installment payments in 1982,
Larson. 1
1983, 1984, and a partial payment in 1985.
Buyers also made certain improvements to the
OPINION
property and the internal roadway at a cost of
over a million dollars, funded in part by a
BENCH, Judge;
construction loan from Tracy Collins Bank &
Plai n t i f f s a p p eal f i o m a j u d gin en t i i:i f a vo i:
Trust Company ("Tracy Collins"). On or

rebutted ....'' Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768.
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about November 23, 1983, sellers executed a
"Consent to Record" with respect to buyers'
plat describing "Phase I" of the project, which
involved six lots and the roadway. The plat
and a "Declaration of Protective Covenants"
were officially recorded on December 23,
1983. The plat indicated that the internal
roadway was to be private, in contravention of
sellers' intent to have the roadway dedicated
to public use.
Although sellers requested the trustee on
January 18, 1984, to release and reconvey lots
1 through 5, no mention of the roadway was
made, and no reconveyance was recorded until
March 28, 1986. Meanwhile, property taxes
for lot 6 and the unplatted property became
due on November 30, 1984. Of the $4,725
assessed for taxes, buyers paid only $1,515.24.
Buyers also paid only a portion of the installment payment due in June 1985.
Sellers subsequently recorded a notice of
default on September 16, 1985, and gave
notice of a trustee's sale of lot 6, the internal
roadway, and all the unplatted property.
Buyers filed this action on September 4, 1986,
the day before the scheduled trustee's sale,
and were granted an order temporarily restraining the sale. The initial temporary restraining order required a cash bond in the amount
of $2,400, which buyers posted. The parties
thereafter stipulated to an injunction pending
trial, and the district court imposed a $50,000
injunction bond. The bond was posted by
Tracy Collins acting as surety for buyers, in
an attempt to protect its security interest on
the construction loan issued to buyers.
In their complaint, buyers sought specific
performance of certain obligations under the
contract, specifically, the release of lot 6, the
internal roadway, and 7.35 acres of the unplatted property. Buyers also sought damages
arising from sellers' alleged breach of contract. Sellers counterclaimed, asserting that
buyers had breached the contract. They sought
dissolution of the injunction, damages for its
wrongful issuance, an order of judicial foreclosure on the property, and recovery on the
trust deed note.
A bench trial was held on January 28-29
and March 22-25, 1988. The trial court held
that buyers had materially breached the contract by failing to pay property taxes on lot 6
and the unplatted acreage, and by failing to
satisfy their 1985 and 1986 installment obligations. The court further held that the contractual breach occurred before any alleged
breach by sellers, and that further performance by sellers was excused after buyers'
breach. Buyers also failed to request release of
lots until after their own breach had already
occurred, facts which the court believed affected the credibility of buyers' claims. In contrast, sellers were found to have substantially
complied with the terms of the contract, and
that the recordation of the Declaration of
UTAH ADVA
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Protective Covenants and the Consent to
Record constituted a release of the roadway.
Judgment was entered for sellers in the
amount of $759,415.63. This amount included
$144,088.75 in attorney fees, which were
awarded under the terms of the trust deed and
note and the contract.
After finding that buyers had breached the
contract, the trial court determined that the
temporary restraining order against sellers had
been wrongfully issued. The court then determined that the appraised fair market value of
the property upon which sellers were entitled
to foreclose was $728,445. That sum was
deducted from the total judgment, leaving
sellers undersecured in the amount of
$30,970.63. The court awarded sellers that
amount against the bonds by entering judgment on the $2,400 cash bond, in full, and
$28,570.63 against the bond posted by Tracy
Collins. The court also determined that four
percent of the attorney fees incurred in
defense of the lawsuit could be attributed to
defending against the wrongfully issued injunction, and awarded attorney fees against the
bonds in the amount of $5,763.55. Buyers and
the surety have brought this consolidated
appeal to challenge the respective judgments
against them.
We first consider the appeal brought by
buyers, who argue that the trial court erred in
concluding that they, not sellers, breached the
contract. Buyers claim entitlement to specific
performance and damages, and argue that
sellers are precluded from recovering attorney
fees. Buyers also claim that the trial court
erred in concluding that they granted to sellers
an easement over the roadway and that the
temporary restraining order had been wrongfully issued.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
At the conclusion of trial, the court made
oral findings encompassing eight transcribed
pages. Thereafter, the court issued its judgment accompanied by 104 separate findings of
fact. Buyers' brief lists over two pages of
issues and subissues. Although buyers state
that "the issues presented in this appeal are
questions of law reviewable by an appellate
court for correctness," we conclude, after
scrutinizing those issues, that buyers are essentially challenging the trial court's findings of
fact.
Buyers argue that sellers breached the contract by failing to make ail the required reconveyances and that this breach was never
excused by buyers' failure to make specific
requests for those releases. Buyers also dispute
the trial court's finding that the evidence
"established that the parties by both mutual
intent and agreement granted to the Defendants the use of the roadway." Buyers further
contest the finding that sellers substantially
performed their obligations under the contCE REPORTS
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ract. Ail of these "legal issues/ however; of legal right." Cobabef 780 P.2d at 836
strike at the trial court's determination of (quoting Cabrera v. Cornell. 694 P.2d 622.,
whether there was a material breach of cont- 625 (Utah 1985)).
ract, and if so, when, and by whom. Such
The contract provides that "the defaulting
questions constitute issues of fact for the fact party shall pay all expenses of enforcing the
finder. See Sjoberg v. Kravik, 759 P.2d 966, same or any right arising out of breach or
969 (Mont. 1988); W'asserburger v. American default thereof, including reasonable attorScientific Chern., Inc., 267 Or. 77, 514 P.2d neys' fees, whether incurred with or without
1097, 1099 (1973) (en banc); see also American suit and both before and after judgment." We
Petrofina Co. v. D & L Oil Supply, inc., 283 conclude, as the trial court implicitly did, that
Or. 183, 583 P.2d 521, 528 (1978) (substantial this provision is unambiguous. Based on the
performance under a contract is a question of
court's determination that buyers breached the
fact).
trust deed, trust deed note, and the contract,
Our standard few overtui ning factual find- the trial court properly ruled that sellers were
ings is a rigorous one- we ma> not set aside entitled to their attorney fees reasonably incsuch findings unless they are clearly erroneous. urred. See, e.g., Dixon \ • Stoddard, 765 P 2d
Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball 786 P.2d 760, 879, 881 (Utah 1988).
761 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). To
The amount of such an award is within the
establish clear error, "|a|n appellant must trial court's discretion, Cobabe, 780 P.2d at
marshal the evidence in support of the find- 836, but must be reasonable, Canyon Country
ings and then demonstrate that despite this Store v. Braceyf 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah
evidence, the trial court's findings are so 1989), and supported by adequate evidence.
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah
weight of the evidence,' ...." In re Bartell, 776 Ct. App. 1988). At the court's instruction,
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. sellers' counsel submitted an affidavit and
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This supporting documents as evidence of reasonburden "is a heavy one, reflective of the fact ableness. We perceive no abuse of discretion
that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on in the trial court's determination that this
disputed facts." Id. at 886. Accordingly, when affidavit, never rebutted, was sufficient to
an appellant fails to carry its burden of mar- support an award of fees. See id.; see also
shaling the evidence, "we refuse to consider Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d
the merits of challenges to the findings and
1039, 1040 (Utah 1975).
accept the findings as valid." Mountain States
THE INJUNCTION BONDS
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions
(UtahCt.App. 1989).
We are thus obliged to consider the findings ("Commissioner"), as receiver for Tracy
from the standpoint of the supporting evid- Collins, appeals the judgment against the injence and not from "appellant's view of the I unction bonds. The Commissioner seeks to
way he or she believes the facts should have avoid liability by arguing for the first time on
been found." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, appeal that the posting of the surety bond was
150 (Utah 1987). Since buyers have not mar- an ultra vires act by Tracy Collins.
Although issues not raised below cannot
shaled the evidence in support of those findings, but merely argue that there is evidence generally be considered on appeal, see James
contradicting them, they have failed to dem- v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.
onstrate that the findings are against the clear 1987), the Commissioner urges us to create an
weight of the evidence. We must therefore exception to this rule under the theory of
accept the findings as valid and affirm the | "adverse domination." This theory provides
:ha as long as a corporation is controlled or
judgment.
, Linated" by wrongdoers against whom a
.a,.'-: o\ action exists, the statute of limitatATTORNEY FEES
With respect to the award of attorney iecs, ion., is tolled because the wrongdoers cannot
"the court may award reasonable fees in ace- ,, be expected to bring an action against themsordance with the terms of the parties' agree- elves. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hudson,
ment." Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, tn F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (D. Kan, 1987),
836 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Trayner v. iI Because Tracy Collins did not have the
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (per power to act as a surety, the Commissioner
curiam)). Although the interpretation of una- alleges, the bank's officers would have been
mbiguous contractual terms is a question of subjected to liability had they asserted the
law to which the trial court's ruling is affo- ultra vires claim at trial. Therefore, so the
rded no particular deference on appeal, Wilburn argument goes, the Commissioner, as receiver,
v. Interstate Elec,
748 P.2d 582, 584- should now be permitted under the theory of
85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, dismissed, 774 adverse domination to assert the claim of ultra
P.2d 1149 (Utah 1989), when those terms are vires on appeal
determined to provide for an award of attoAlthough there are exceptions to the rule
rney fees, they are to be "awarded as a matter prohibiting consideration of issues for the first
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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time on appeal, they are few in number. See
State v. Webb, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 4748 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (e.g., exceptional
circumstances, plain error, liberty interests). It
appears that such exceptions are to be applied
only when gross injustice resulting from application of the rule overwhelms its purposethat being to correct errors at trial, avoiding
"a merry-go-round of litigation." Bundy v.
Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah
1984) (quoting Simpson v. General Motors
Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401
(Utah 1970)).
The Commissioner has brought to our attention no exceptional circumstance to support
the carving out of yet another exception to the
rules of appellate review. Although the Commissioner urges us to adopt its approach by
noting that it was not a party below, buyers
were likewise deprived of the opportunity to
submit the ultra vires issue to the trial court
and have it resolved without the necessity of
this appeal. Since the Commissioner offers no
authority for extending the theory of adverse
domination beyond the limitation of actions
against corporate wrongdoers, and we see no
other reason to do so, we decline to consider
its claim of ultra vires. Accord Wallace Bank
& Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 40 Idaho
712, 237 P. 284, 287 (1925) (ultra vires may
not be asserted for the first time on appeal).
We next address the Commissioner's claim
that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees incurred in resisting the temporary
restraining order. The trial court accepted
sellers' calculation that four percent of their
total attorney fees of $144,088.75 were spent
defending against the "injunction."3 The trial
court then awarded $5,763.55 of those fees
against the bonds.
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c) provides that:
Except as otherwise provided by
law, no restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except
upon the giving of security by the
applicant, in such sum as the court
deems proper, for the payment of
such costs and damages as may be
incurred or suffered by any party
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
Our supreme court has determined that
"damages" subject to recovery under this rule
include the attorney fees of the party wrongfully enjoined. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681
P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984). We have since
extended that recovery to attorney fees incurred as the result of a wrongfully issued temporary restraining order. See Beard v.
Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). When attorney fees are incurred in
defending against wrongfully obtained injunctive relief and also against an underlying
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lawsuit, it is appropriate to determine how
much of the total fees are attributable to resisting the injunction. See id.; see also Artistic
Hairdressers, Inc. v. Levy, 87 Nev. 313, 486
P.2d 482, 484 (1971) (only the attorney fees
directly related to dissolution of the wrongful
injunction are recoverable). We therefore
affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees
against the bonds.
We last address the Commissioner's argument that the trial court used an incorrect
measure in awarding damages under rule
65A(c) against the injunction bonds. The trial
court calculated damages by adding principal
($371,739.35), interest ($203,664.50), late fees
($14,869.57), taxes ($20,368.62), attorney fees
($144,469.75), trustee's fees ($1,803.80), and
costs ($2,881.04) for a total of $759,796.63.
The court next considered the testimony at
trial of a real property appraiser who determined that the fair market value of the unconveyed property was $17,500 to $20,000 per
acre at the time the temporary restraining
order was imposed. The trial court then found
that the value of the property on the date of
judgment was $20,000 per acre, totalling
$728,445.00. Since the value of the property as
collateral was less than the total judgment, the
trial court found that buyers were undersecured and awarded the difference ($30,970.63)
as damages for the wrongfully issued injunction.
The Commissioner claims that this calculation was erroneous, and asserts that the
correct measure of damages is /rthe reduction
or diminution in the value of the security
during the period of restraint." Glens Falls
Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 83 Nev. 196, 427
P.2d 1, 4 (1967). See also Global Contact
Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254 So. 2d 807, 809 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1971). We agree. Although
sellers were restrained from foreclosing the
property for approximately two years, they
retained both the trust deed note and the
unconveyed property during that time. The
trial court found that the value of the property
did not diminish in those two years. Any
measure of damages other than a comparison
of the fair market value of the property before
and after the injunction is thus incorrect.
Sellers argue, however, that buyers' argument ignores the concept of "present value."
They contend that the award of interest under
the judgment is inadequate, under the assumption that they would have had available the
interest earning capacity of the foreclosure sale
proceeds had the sale been held as scheduled.
Alternatively, they suggest that an appraisal
showing the value of the property in 1988 to
be the same as that in 1986 actually represents
a decrease in value when the effect of inflation
is taken into account. Aside from the speculative nature of such claims, sellers' interest
losses on the trust deed note were taken into
consideration and awarded as part of the total
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judgment. Interest was awarded at the rate of
twelve percent on the unpaid principal, eighteen percent on the payments in default, and
also included a four percent late payment
charge. Surely those charges more than compensated sellers for the interest-bearing potential of money or the effects of inflation
during the two-year period.
In any event, the Commissioner is correct in
asserting that "recoverable damages under
such a bond are those that arise from the
operation of the injunction itself and not from
damages occasioned by the suit independently
of the injunction." Beard, 741 P.2d at 969
(quoting Lever Bros, Co. \ International
Chem. Workers Union, 554 F.2d 115, 120 (4th
Cir. 1976)). On that basis, the interest accrued
on the trust deed note during the delay in the
sale of the property may be awarded in the
judgment, as was done in this case, but cannot
also be attributed as damages under the injunction bond. See Glens Fails, 427 P.2d at 4.
Since sellers did not demonstrate any damages
attributable to the imposition of the injunction
other than a portion of their attorney fees, the
award of damages against the bonds must be
reversed
In summary, we affirm the judgment on the
contract. We reverse the award of damages
against the injunction bonds, except for the
attorney fees. Such fees are to be assessed
against the bonds in a proportion to be determined by the trial court.
Affirmed in part, reversed, in part, and
remanded. No costs awarded.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
John Farr Larson, Judge
1. John Farr Larson, Senior juvenile Court judge,
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
Code Ann- §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989).
2. 'Planned unit development* is generally defined
as a private residential development on acreage of
certain minimum size, usually large enough to constitute a new community. See Stevens v. Essex
Junction Zoning Bd., 139 Vt. 297, 428 A.2d 1100,
1103(1981).
3. The reference to an * injunction* appears to refer
to both the temporary restraining order and the
stipulated, preiiminary i nj unction
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